The army and democracy: military politics in Pakistan by Samad, A. Yunas
 The University of Bradford Institutional 
Repository 
http://bradscholars.brad.ac.uk 
This work is made available online in accordance with publisher policies. Please refer to the 
repository record for this item and our Policy Document available from the repository home 
page for further information. 
To see the final version of this work please visit the publisher’s website. Access to the 
published online version may require a subscription. 
Link to publisher’s version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2015.1128574 
Citation: Samad Y (2016) The army and democracy: military politics in Pakistan. Commonwealth 
and Comparative Politics. 54(1): 144-146. 
Copyright statement: © 2016 Taylor & Francis. This is an Author's Original Manuscript of an 
article published by Taylor & Francis in Commonwealth & Comparative Politics on 11 Jan 2016 
available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2015.1128574 
 
The army and democracy: Military politics in Pakistan, by Aqil Shah, Cambridge, Mass, 
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Aqil Shah’s book makes an important contribution to the growing literature on the Pakistan 
army. Its focus is different from other publications in that it attempts to understand the 
motivation and processes that has led to the army’s manifold interventions in the political 
arena. It does this by situating the case study of Pakistan within two sets of literature: civil-
military relations and democratization theory. From this perspective international literature 
predominantly, but not exclusively, from the South American and Middle Eastern experience 
of democratization informs the introductory chapter which examines how regimes transit 
from authoritarianism to democracy. These perspectives theoretically inform the subsequent 
chapters on Pakistan’s experience of authoritarian rule from Ayub Khan’s martial law 
through to Musharraf’s rule. 
The author’s attempts to explain the framework of the military mind-set that justifies 
and rationalizes military intervention by identifying two concepts: guardianship to 
governorship, which is used to justify the military’s direct and indirect role in Pakistan’s 
chequered politics. Shah disagrees with the view that Ayub Khan’s coup was promoted by 
Washington and instead argues that the US’ main concern was stability during the Cold War 
and is also critical of justifications used by the military at pivotal junctures in Pakistan’s 
history. For example he exonerates Zulfikhar Bhutto’s role in the breakup of Pakistan by 
placing the primary responsibility on the army.  Likewise Shah claims that General 
Musharraf deliberately misled Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the Kargil plan.  
In evaluating the army’s justifications the author also investigated the mentality of the 
army officers which is inculcated with a deliberately low opinion of politicians and an over 
inflated estimation of their own capabilities and exclusive capacity to protect national 
security determined exclusively by the external threat perception of India. While there has 
been anecdotal evidence of such an officer mentality this is the first systematic attempt to 
document and understand how this mentality is nurtured. Shah demonstrates that officers are 
calculatingly socialised through command training on the legitimate role of the military to 
intervene, their role as the ultimate watch dog of the nation, the inappropriateness of the 
democratic system, dynastic characteristics of political parties, a central concern with India 
and the fear of a war on two fronts. Interestingly the highly negative views of the political 
process militate against permanent military rule due to concerns that its corrosive effects will 
impact on the army. 
Shah returns to the theoretical dimension in the conclusion which probably is the most 
interesting chapter of the book. He asks how the democratization process can be advanced 
and argues that the change of civilian regime by means of an election (the so-called turnover 
test) is not sufficient. What his investigations show is the militarization of key civilian 
institutions in particular the Ministry of Defence, the Inter-Services Intelligence and the para-
military forces as well as a lack of parliamentary oversight. All of this makes it relatively 
easy for the army to maintain autonomy from civilian control and thus make it relatively easy 
to take over when necessary. Shah argues that these institutions need to be under full civilian 
control, that defence should be securitinized by parliament and that the security committee 
has to have teeth. Alternative nodes of power such as the judiciary and the media need to be 
strengthened. In addition the national educational curriculum, and the command college, need 
to make it clear that the military is subordinate to parliament. Furthermore the lead agency in 
dealing with terrorism should be the police, the army playing only a support role, which 
would requires the police to be reformed and depoliticized. Finally he suggests that it is in 
Washington’s interest to see democracy develop in Pakistan as this would be the best way to 
contain terrorism and nuclear proliferation in the region. War as an external factor that could 
promote democracy by critically weakening the army is an unlikely scenario as the high risk 
of a nuclear confrontation makes this option fraught with danger. 
Given the extended periods of military the earlier parts of the book covers a period of 
Pakistan’s political history which is already fairly well known. Thus, the sections covering 
the period prior to Musharraf often fall between two stools; these passages are either not 
theoretically informed enough or do not bring new empirical data to table. New data however 
is deployed in the latter chapters particularly from the Musharraf period onwards by 
investigating officer mentality and the depth of military penetration of civilian institutions 
even when not in power. This material, along with the theoretical insights offered, enables 
Aqil Shah to make a valuable contribution to our understanding of the Pakistan army. 
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